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The History, Application, and Policy of the 
Judicially Created Standards of Review for 
Arbitration Awards 
Arbitration, intended to reduce federal court caseload,' is 
producing an increased amount of litigation. The proper stan- 
dard for review of arbitration awards continues to be a puzzle 
to litigants, and to some extent to the judiciary. Much of the 
confusion can be traced to two conflicting federal policies. On 
the one hand, both Congress and federal courts support arbitra- 
tion as one method of relieving oppressive caseloads. Therefore, 
to promote the finality of arbitration, courts generally defer to 
the arbitrator's determination of the merits of an  award. For a 
court to review the merits would reduce arbitration from an  
efficient, private means of resolving disputes to a mere pre- 
litigation formality. 
On the other hand, absolute deference is inappropriate. 
The Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States 
in the federal c o ~ r t s , ~  not in arbitrators. Therefore, federal 
courts should review the merits when arbitration awards im- 
pinge on the judicial power. For example, courts have the re- 
sponsibility to represent the general public interest and cannot 
permit a violation of public policy, enforce illegal contracts, or 
otherwise condone illegal behavior. Therefore, arbitration 
awards violating public policy or the law require federal court 
review. 
Enacted in 1925, the United States Arbitration Act ("Act")3 
provides four broad standards under which an arbitration 
award may be ~ a c a t e d . ~  Section ten of the Act "authorizes va- 
1. As one federal circuit court noted, the goal of arbitration is "to relieve 
congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method for 
dispute resolution that would be speedier and less costly than litigation." 
Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981). 
2. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . establish." U.S. 
CONST. art. 111, § 1. 
3. 9 U.S.C. $9 1-14 (1988). 
4. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West Supp. 1992) provides in part: 
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catur of an award in cases of specified misconduct or misbe- 
havior on the arbitrators' part, actions in excess of arbitral 
powers, or failures to consummate the award."' In addition to 
these statutory standards, the federal judiciary has formulated 
other standards under which arbitration awards may be vacat- 
ed. 
The purpose of this comment is to identify these judicially 
created standards and to analyze their history, application, and 
underlying policies. Federal courts, implementing a policy that 
favors arbitration, have applied these standards in an unneces- 
sarily formalistic and narrow manner. This comment addresses 
each of the current standards-essence of the contract, mani- 
fest disregard of the law, illegality, and public policy-and 
concludes that, in order to promote arbitration, federal courts 
should adopt a broader, more rational approach to reviewing 
arbitration awards. 
11. THE ESSENCE OF THE CONTRACT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Historical Background 
The standard of review most often used for arbitration 
awards, the "essence of the contract" standard, was established 
by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Gorp? In that case, a group of employees was 
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the 
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the 
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration- 
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means. 
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, 
or either of them. 
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbe- 
havior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. 
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made. 
Detailed discussion of these statutory grounds is beyond the scope of this comment. 
For an excellent review, see Margaret Shulenberger, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of $ 10(a-d) of United States Arbitration Act of 1947 (9 USCS # 1Wa- 
dl), Providing Grounds for Vacating Arbitration Awards, 20 A.L.R. FED: 295 (1986). 
5 .  Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). 
6. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Enterprise Wheel is one of three related cases decided 
the same day that are known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. The other two cases are 
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fired for walking off the job to protest the discharge of another 
employee.' The collective bargaining agreement between the 
union and the employer provided that any disagreements "as to 
the meaning and application" of the contract should be submit- 
ted to final, binding arbitration.' The arbitrator reinstated the 
workers after a ten day suspension but the employer refused to 
comply with the award.g Upon the union's motion to enforce 
the award, the district court directed the employer to comply. 
The court of appeals, however, vacated the award.'' 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[tlhe refusal of 
courts to review the merits of an  arbitration award is the prop- 
er approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agree- 
ments."" The arbitrator has authority to interpret and apply 
the contract, the parties having bargained for his "informed 
judgment" regarding the "knowledge of the custom and practic- 
es of a particular factory or of a particular industry."12 The 
Court recognized only a narrow exception to the finality of a n  
arbitration award. 
[Aln arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of 
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dis- 
pense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course 
look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legiti- 
mate only so long as i t  draws its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest 
an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to 
refuse enforcement of the award.13 
In short, this deferential standard of review, intended to sup- 
port the federal policy favoring labor arbitration, forbids courts 
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (holding that a 
court c a ~ o t  rule on the merits of the grievance if the parties have agreed to 
submit a dispute to arbitration in their collective bargaining agreement), and 
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (estab- 
lishing a presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes if the collective bargaining 
agreement contains an arbitration clause). 
7. 363 U.S. at 595. 
8. Id. at 594. 
9. Id. at 595. 
10. Id. at 595-96. The collective bargaining agreement expired before the award 
was issued. The court of appeals vacated the award because the reinstatement and 
the award of back pay could not be enforced. Id. 
11. Id. at 596. 
12. Id. at 596-97. 
13. Id. at 597. 
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from overturning awards arising out of the essence of the un- 
derlying contract. 
B. Application 
The essence of the contract standard has been applied 
frequently over the years. Most notably, the Supreme Court 
expressly reaffirmed the standard in United Paperworkers 
International Union v. Misco, Inc. l4 In Misco, the employer 
appealed an arbitrator's reinstatement of a discharged employ- 
eel5 and the district court vacated the award on the ground 
that it violated public policy; the court of appeals afErmed.16 
In a discussion reminiscent of Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme 
Court reversed, once again asserting that the arbitrator's role 
in labor disputes is essentially one of a contract-reader. The 
Court reasoned that arbitral decisions are insulated from judi- 
cial review because the parties bargained for "the arbitrator's 
view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract."" The 
Court concluded that because the parties have "authorized the 
arbitrator to  give meaning to the language of the agreement," 
the fact that the arbitrator "misread" the contract establishes 
no ground on which the awaxd can be set aside? 
The lower courts have developed numerous variations of 
the essence of the contract standard. These variations set aside 
an award if it is "completely irrati~nal,"'~ "unfounded in rea- 
son and fact,"20 "arbitrary and caprici~us,"~~ "palpably 
14. 484 U.S. 29 (1987). 
15. Id. at  34. 
16. Id. at  34-35. For a more detailed analysis of Misco and the public policy 
exception, see infra part V. 
17. Id. at 37-38. 
18. Id. at  38. The Court explained: 
[Ilnterpretation or application of a labor agreement must draw its essence 
from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator's own notions of 
industrial justice. But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably constru- 
ing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, 
that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to 
overturn his decision. 
Id. 
19. French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Femer & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 
(9th Cir. 1986). 
20. United Food & Commercial Workers v. Stop & Shop Co., 776 F.2d 19, 21 
(1st Cir. 1985). In this case the court said that an arbitration award may be set 
aside if it is "(1) unfounded in reason and fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably 
faulty that no judge, or group of judges, ever could conceivably have made such a 
ruling; or (3) mistakenly based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non- 
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faulty,"22 not "plausible ,"23 or in "[mlanifest disregard of the 
law."24 Whatever label applied, the vast majority of disputed 
arbitration awards are affirmed under the essence of the con- 
tract s t a ~ ~ d a r d . ~ ~  
C. Analysis 
Seven years before Misco, one scholar asserted that review- 
ing courts all too oRen explore the merits of arbitral interpreta- 
tion despite the Supreme Court's clear mandate in Enterprise 
Wheel that courts not pass on the merits of arbitration 
awards.26 He noted that we do not need "more verbal formula- 
tions of the proper scope of review," but rather a return to a 
fact." Id. 
21. Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fewer & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412 
(11th Cir. 1990). 
22. International Elec. Workers v. Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 489 F.2d 768, 
769 (1st Cir. 1973); Safeway Stores v. American Bakery & Confectionery Workers 
Int'l Union, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968). 
23. Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery Workers Int'l Union, 412 F.2d 899, 903 (9th 
Cir. 1969). 
24. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 
(2d. Cir. 1986) (In addition to other standards, an arbitration award may be set 
aside if it is in "[mlanifest disregard of the law."). 
The "manifest disregard of the law" standard is included in this list because 
many courts regard it as merely a variation of the essence of the contract stan- 
dard. However, the two standards are different in many important respects. While 
essence of the contract is used to determine whether the arbitrator is construing 
the contract, manifest disregard of the law refers to the arbitrator's failure to rely 
on outside, governing law. See infra part 111. 
Courts have reasoned that these various formulations of the standard can be 
reduced to some sort of abuse of discretion standard. See Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 
914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We regard the standard of review undergirding 
these various formulations as identical . . . ."); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 
Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[Sleveral . . . terms of art have been 
employed to ensure that the arbitrator's decision relies on his interpretation of the 
contract as contrasted with his own beliefs of fairness and justice."). 
25. Ladish Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 966 
F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992). 
Regardless of the label applied, the general rule stands that an arbitrator may 
not ignore the plain language of the contract. Though most arbitration awards are 
affirmed under the essence of the contract standard, courts in a small group of 
cases have vacated awards that were contrary to the plain language of the con- 
tract. E.g., AP Parts Co. v. UAW, 923 F.2d 488, 491-92 (6th Cir. 1991) (ignoring 
the plain language of the contract, the arbitrator "dired[ed] the parties to negoti- 
ate again what they had settled" in previous contract talks); Leed Architectural 
Prods., Inc. v. United Steelworkers Local 6674, 916 F.2d 63, 66 (6th Cir. 1990) 
("arbitrator disregarded . . . the contract" by allowing an unlawful wage rate to 
stand and altering the bargained-for rate of other employees to match). 
26. Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Ju- 
dicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270-74 (1980). 
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more clear understanding of the basics: the role of the arbitra- 
The various verbal formulations of the Enterprise Wheel 
standard are both unnecessary and confusing. Without a clear 
recognition that these standards stem from the same source, 
they expand the grounds for vacating an award, thereby in- 
creasing the possibility that a judge will, in fact, review the 
merits of an award. But most important, these formulations 
distract the judiciary from the essential question of the 
arbitrator's function and from the purpose underlying judicial 
deference to arbitration awards. These considerations should 
ultimately control any decision regarding the proper scope of 
review for arbitration awards. Fortunately, many courts are not 
misled and seem to recognize that all of these verbal formula- 
tions refer to the same standard.28 
Nevertheless, some ambiguity exists even after Misco's 
affirmation of the Enterprise Wheel standard. As the Sixth 
Circuit recently noted, literal application of the Misco standard 
may lead to the absurd result that an arbitration award not 
interpreting or relying on the contract may nonetheless be 
insulated from review, so long as the arbitrator was "arguably 
construing or applying the contract."2g Because "arguably" is 
an extremely broad term, nearly all decisions by arbitrators 
can be said to have some basis in the ~ontract.~' A more nar- 
row reading of Misco is therefore required, not only to effectu- 
ate the parties' chosen method of dispute resolution, but to 
ensure that courts still have the power to set aside an award 
that reflects the arbitrator's "own brand of industrial jus- 
ti~e."~' 
The Sixth Circuit has suggested a two-step inquiry when 
determining whether an award is "arguably" based on the con- 
tract. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the 
arbitrator interpreted or applied a specific term of the contract. 
If not, then the award is not arguably drawn from the "essence" 
of the contract and cannot be enforced. Second, if the 
27. Id. at 274. 
28. See supra note 24. 
29. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 984, No. 90- 
5933, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760, at *13 (6th Cir. O d .  10, 1991) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at *14 (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 36 (quoting United Steelworkers v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960))). 
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arbitrator's interpretation of the contract is arguably 
then even the reviewing court's belief that the arbitrator has 
"committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his deci- 
~ i o n . " ~ ~  The Sixth Circuit's approach confines arbitrators to 
the terms of the contract and allows for a judicial check on 
arbitrator "industrial justice." Moreover, this approach is easily 
applied and supports arbitral finality. 
111. THE MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Historical Background 
Although some federal circuit courts maintain that the 
"manifest disregard of the law" standard is nothing more than 
a verbal variation of the Enterprise Wheel "essence of the con- 
tract" standard,34 in reality, each is an  independent standard 
of review. While the Enterprise Wheel standard applies to the 
arbitrator's interpretation of the contract, the manifest disre- 
gard of the law standard relates to the arbitrator's interpreta- 
tion and application of the governing law outside the agree- 
ment. 
The "manifest disregard" standard originated from dicta in 
the 1953 Supreme Court decision Wilko v. Swan.35 In Wilko 
the Court declared invalid the use of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in securities agreements, primarily because of "the old judi- 
cial hostility to a rb i t ra t i~n ."~~ The Wilko Court was uncom- 
fortable with arbitration of security disputes under federal law 
because arbitrators lack "judicial instruction on the law," 
awards may be made without explanation or a complete record 
of the arbitration proceedings, and "[plower to vacate an  award 
is limited."37 The Court noted the following in dicta: 
While it may be true . . . that a failure of the arbitrators to 
decide in accordance with [applicable law] would "constitute 
grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section ten of the 
Federal Arbitration Act," that failure would need to be made 
32. Id. at *13. 
33. Misco, 484 U.S. at 38. 
34. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
35. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
36. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d 
Cir. 1942). 
37. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436. 
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clearly t o  appear. . . . [TJhe interpretations of the law by the 
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, 
in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpreta- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Although the Supreme Court later reversed Wilko to allow 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in securities contracts, the 
"manifest disregard" language remains influential. Applying 
this standard, many circuit courts have determined that the 
arbitrators must "understand and correctly state the law, but 
proceed to disregard the same" before a court can review the 
award on the merits.39 But the most often cited formulation of 
the manifest disregard standard originated in the Second Cir- 
cuit. There, the court stated that to meet this standard re- 
quires more than a mere misunderstanding with respect to the 
law: 
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readi- 
ly and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to 
serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies 
that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly gov- 
erning legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no atten- 
tion to it.40 
Citing the Steelworkers Trilogy:' the Second Circuit noted 
that the well-established federal policy favoring arbitration 
required the adoption of this strict formulation of the manifest 
disregard of the law ~tandard.~ '  
B. Application 
Courts are extremely reluctant to vacate an award because 
of allegations that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the 
law." In the name of judicial deference to arbitration awards, 
38. Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
39. See, e-g., Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc.{ 783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th 
Cir.) (quoting San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 
293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986). 
40. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, F e ~ e r  & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d 
Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit has adopted virtually the same standard, stating that 
it requires a "willful unattentiveness to  the governing law." Jenkins v. Prudential- 
Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988). 
41. See supra note 6. 
42. Bobker, 808 F.2d at  933. 
43. The author has yet to find a case where an arbitration award was vacated 
because the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law as presently defined. See 
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the federal circuits have erected a virtually insurmountable 
standard of review. Before a court can review the propriety of 
an  award, there must be a showing that the arbitrator first 
correctly ascertained the applicable law and then expressly 
manifested an intention, on the record, to disregard it. This 
requires the party moving to vacate the award to make a two- 
part showing. First, the party must show on the record that the 
arbitrator correctly ascertained the applicable law. This often 
proves impossible because arbitrators are not required to give 
reasons, let alone legal analysis, justifying an award.44 A fail- 
ure to make the showing is fatal. In O.R. Securities, Inc. v. 
Professional Planning Asso~iates,4~ Professional Planning As- 
sociates entered into binding arbitration to resolve a dispute 
with WZW Financial Services, Inc. (WZW). Soon thereafter, 
WZW transferred its assets to O.R. Securities (O.R.), whose 
attempt to avoid the arbitration failed.46 After losing at arbi- 
tration, O.R. filed suit in federal court to vacate the award, 
claiming that it had not assumed WZWs liabilitiese4' The 
court held that because the arbitrators failed to provide any 
explanation of their award, O.R. could not make a showing that 
the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law? 
Second, assuming a party seeking vacatur of an award can 
prove the arbitrators correctly ascertained the applicable law, 
the party must also show that the arbitrator's express intention 
to disregard it. As the O.R. Securities court explained, "there 
must be some showing in the record, other than the result ob- 
tained, that the arbitrators knew the law and expressly disre- 
garded it."49 Due t o  the inherent difficulty in proving arbitral 
intent, it is not surprising that few, if any, arbitration awards 
have been vacated under the manifest disregard standard.50 
Shulenberger, supra note 4, at  367 (arbitration awards generally not vacated under 
manifest disregard of the law). 
44. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 
(1960) (arbitrators are not required to give reasons for award); Sobel v. Hertz, 
Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (2d Cir. 1972) (arbitrators are not required 
to explain award). 
45. 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1988). 
46. Id. at  744. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 747. Likewise, in Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 
743 (8th Cir. 1986), the court refused to find that the arbitrators manifestly disre- 
garded the law because the arbitration award "does not clearly delineate the law 
applied, nor expound the reasoning and analysis used." Id. a t  750. 
49. 857 F.2d a t  747 (emphasis added). 
50. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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C. Analysis 
The current formulation of the manifest disregard of the 
law standard of judicial review actually promotes disregard of 
the applicable law, lacks any potency whatsoever, and under- 
mines rather than supports the federal policy favoring arbitra- 
tion. 
The present doctrine does little more than provide an in- 
centive for arbitrators to  disregard the law, especially when the 
arbitrator is not a lawyer. In effect, when arbitrators are faced 
with the application of governing law outside the contract, they 
can avoid any complicated legal analysis by ignoring the issue 
altogether. As long as they are careful not to give any reasons 
for the award, their actions will receive absolute deference and 
never be questioned. 
Although some judicial review is necessary to prevent arbi- 
trators from disregarding the law, the federal circuit courts 
have defined the applicable standard out of existence. Surely, if 
an arbitrator were to ascertain the law, expressly manifest on 
the record an intention to ignore it, and do so, the award could 
be vacated on statutory grounds.51 The present judicial formu- 
lation of the standard, then, is meaningless. 
The current application of the manifest disregard standard 
also ignores the underlying policy consideration of the arbitra- 
tion system. Ironically, courts consistently point out that the 
underlying reason for applying this overly deferential standard 
of review is the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. To 
adopt a less strict standard, reasoned one circuit court, would 
undermine arbi t ra t i~n.~~ Even so, the current standard reduc- 
es the legitimacy of the arbitration system because it erects an 
insurmountable barrier to judicial review of arbitration deci- 
sions that may completely disregard applicable law, whether 
statutory or case law. Public trust and confidence in the arbi- 
tral system are essential to achieve the goal of relieving conges- 
tion in the courts.53 Therefore, courts should determine 
51. An expressed intention on the record to disregard the law could show "cor- 
ruption, fraud," "evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators" or that they 
"exceeded their powers." 9 U.S.C.A. 8 10(a)(l)-(5) (West Supp. 1992). 
52. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, F e ~ e r  & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
53. This is especially true in the context of commercial arbitration as opposed 
to labor arbitration. Whereas an employer generally waives its right to judicial 
process in return for a union's promise not to strike, the private litigant does not 
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whether the current standard of review actually enhances pub- 
lic confidence in the system, thereby increasing the number of 
disputes resolved privately. 
Until the judiciary and Congress realize that the standards 
of review afforded arbitration affect its very legitimacy, we are 
left with a private dispute resolution system clearly inferior to 
litigation. Recognizing this fact, the Eighth Circuit gave "no- 
tice" to future litigants that "the arbitration system is an inferi- 
or system of justice, structured without due process, rules of 
evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law."54 The 
Eighth Circuit concluded that "the courts are not equipped" to 
these review arbitration awards.55 
IV. THE ILLEGALITY STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Historical Background 
The standards of illegality and public policy overlap a great 
deal and are often grouped together by the courts. The Su- 
preme Court recently suggested that the two standards exist 
independently. "A court's refusal to enforce a n  arbitrator's 
award . . . because it is contrary to public policy is a specific 
application of the more general doctrine, rooted in the common 
law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate 
law or public The Court explained further that the 
doctrine stems from the dual concepts that courts will not aid 
any party in committing an "immoral or illegal act," and that 
the judiciary represents the interests of the publ i~.~ '  
Each standard is independent to some extent. The illegali- 
ty standard is concerned with whether the underlying contract 
or the award violates the law; the public policy standard, on 
the other hand, deals with whether enforcing the award would 
somehow violate the public's interests. Analyzing the illegality 
and public policy standards and their respective underlying 
policies separately may help to clarify the judiciary's role in  
reviewing arbitration awards. 
receive the same kind of benefit for waiving this right. Stroh Container Co. v. 
Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743,'751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987). 
57. Id. 
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B. Application 
Cases in which an  award has been vacated because it vio- 
lates the law can be grouped into three categories: (1) cases in 
which the arbitrator has applied an incorrect legal standard; 
(2) cases in which the underlying contract was made in viola- 
tion of the law; and (3) awards that compel a violation of the 
law. 
The first category of cases consists of situations in which 
the arbitrator applies an incorrect legal standard. Although the 
Supreme Court has stated that federal courts are not allowed 
to reverse an arbitrator's award based on legal errors,58 a few 
circuit courts seem to hold that some egregious legal errors 
actually violate the law. 
The most illustrative case in this group, Broadway Cab 
Cooperative, Inc. v. Teamsters & Chauffeurs Local Union No. 
281 t9 involved arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
arbitrator violated "law and public policy" by using the rule of 
estoppel to "thwart the purposes of a statute of the United 
States?' In doing so, the arbitrator applied "an incorrect 
legal standard" and contradicted an  "explicit mandate of the 
Supreme Court."' The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[a] con- 
58. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (holding that arbitrators' legal 
interpretations are not subject to judicial review), overruled on other grounds, 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsodAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). 
Most circuit courts have followed suit. O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning 
Assoc., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that "[clourts are 
generally prohibited from vacating an arbitration award on the basis of errors of 
law or interpretation"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 
930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring more for vacatur than "error or misunderstand- 
ing with respect to the law"); Office of Supply, Republic of Korea v. New York 
Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that "[aln award will not 
be set aside because of an error on the part of the arbitrators in their interpreta- 
tion of the law"). 
59. 710 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1983). For another interesting case, see General 
Telephone Co. v. Local 1635, 427 F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Pa. 1977), where the court 
vacated an award that held unlawful, and therefore unenforceable, a provision of a 
collective bargaining agreement that denied sick pay benefits for absence due to 
pregnancy. The arbitrator, the court noted, went outside the agreement to make 
the determination, relying on current case law that had recently been overruled by 
the Supreme Court. Id. at 399. 
60. Broadway Cab, 710 F.2d at 1384. 
61. Id. The arbitrator, in deciding whether certain sub-contractors were "em- 
ployees" under the "hot-cargo" provisions of the National Labor Relations Ad, 
relied on principles of estoppel rather than the common law agency test. Id. at 
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trary holding might discourage arbitration because employers 
would be less likely to submit issues to an arbitrator if they 
knew that he could disregard the merits of a legal argument 
that a district court would be forced to con~ ide r . "~~  The court 
also noted that only where the arbitrator applies the correct 
legal standard is his decision subject to the limited review an- 
nounced in the Steelworkers Trilogy.63 
Similarly, the Second Circuit recently upheld an  arbitra- 
tion award that the district court modified to conform with the 
federal post-judgment interest rate statute in Carte Blanche 
(Singapore) v. Carte Blanch International, Ltd.64 Noting that 
its power to review awards is "narrowly circumscribed" by 
current case law,65 the court nevertheless concluded that the 
district court's modification of the arbitration award was cor- 
rect? 
The second category of cases involves situations in which 
the underlying collective bargaining agreement or contract is 
illegal. Although very few cases fall into this category, it never- 
theless represents a problematic area not addressed by the 
Arbitration Act. The underlying rationale of the illegality stan- 
dard of review is that courts have the ultimate responsibility to 
refuse to enforce illegal contracts, a duty that is not diminished 
even when illegal contracts are presented to the court in the 
context of arbitration awards. 
In Botany Industries, Inc. u. New York Joint Board, Amal- 
gamated Clothing  worker^,^' the district court vacated an  ar- 
1381. The Supreme Court had recently held that in interpreting the "hot-cargo" 
provision, courts must apply the common law agency test and expressly foreclosed 
the use of the estoppel principles used by the arbitrator. Id. at 1384. 
62. Id. at  1384. 
63. Id. 
64. 888 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1989). 
65. Id. at 265, 
66. Id. at  270. The court did not specify which doctrine of review it used to 
uphold the modification, perhaps because only three years earlier the same court, 
in a similar case, refused to review an award because the arbitrator had not 
manifestly disregarded the law. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, F e ~ e r  & Smith, Inc. v. 
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). Had the circui$ court applied the man- 
ifest disregard of the law standard as restrictively as it had in the former case, 
Carte Blanche would surely have been decided differently. Bobker suggests that, 
short of manifest disregard of the law, courts should give absolute deference to 
arbitrators' interpretations of the law. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying 
text. Nothing in Carte. Blanche suggests that any party made such a showing. 
67. 375 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), vacated as m o t  sub nom. Robb v. New 
York Bd. of Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974) (va- 
cating the decision due to the bankruptcy of one of the parties). 
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bitration award because the underlying collective bargaining 
agreement, not the award itself, violated the law. The court 
avoided the issue of judicial deference to arbitration awards by 
carefully pointing out that it was not reviewing the merits of 
the award-the arbitrator's construction of the contract. Rath- 
er, the court was "actually concerned with the lawfulness of its 
enforcing the award."6s Turning to basic contract law, the 
court focused on the fundamental doctrine that "a contract 
made in violation of a statute is and held that the un- 
derlying collective bargaining agreement violated the "hot-car- 
go" provision of the National Labor Relations Act.?' In so hold- 
ing, the court reasoned that "[ilf the agreement is void, it is not 
legitimized by the arbitral process; and if the agreement is 
unenforceable, it is not rendered enforceable by an arbitrator's 
decision. Simply stated, the court cannot enforce an invalid 
collective bargaining agreement, either directly . . . or indirect- 
ly, by enforcement of the award."?' 
In Jackson Purchase Rural Electric Cooperative Ass'n u. 
Local Union 81 6, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- 
e r ~ , ? ~  the employer unilaterally discontinued its long-standing 
practice of deducting union dues from employee paychecks. 
Although the collective bargaining agreement was silent on the 
issue of withholding of union dues, the union filed a grievance 
and the arbitrator ordered the employer to continue to withhold 
the dues upon obtaining the necessary employee authoriza- 
t i ~ n . ? ~  Withholding union dues without employee authoriza- 
tion is illegal under federal law.74 The court of appeals invali- 
dated the arbitrator's award because it was based on an illegal 
implied contract. In a discussion similar to that in Botany In- 
dustries, the court reasoned that "a promise is unenforceable if 
68. Id. at  490 (quoting Local 985, UAW v. W.M. Chace Co., 262 F. Supp. 114, 
117 (E.D. Mich. 1966)). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 499. 
71. Id. at 491. 
72. 646 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1981). 
73. Id. a t  266. The arbitrator ordered the employer to continue checking off 
union dues "upon receipt of proper authorization cards from the employees," thus 
making the practice legal under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
186(c)(4) (providing that if the employer has received written consent from the 
employees, i t  may check off union dues). The award, therefore, mandated nc af- 
firmative conduct in violation of federal statutes but was based on an illegal con- 
tract. 646 F.2d at 266. 
74. 646 F.2d at  266. See 29 U.S.C. $ 186(a)(l) (1988). 
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legislation so provides" and concluded that "one who has him- 
self participated in an illegal act cannot be permitted to assert 
in a court of justice any right founded upon or growing out of 
the illegal t ransa~t ion."~~ Relying on the "strong presumption 
that agreements in violation of a statute" are void,76 the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's vacatur of the award.77 
The third category of illegality cases involves arbitration 
awards that compel a violation of the law. For example, in  
General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard 
Brands, Inc. ,78 the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce an  arbitra- 
tion award that required the defendant employer to benefit one 
group of employees a t  the expense of a second group because 
such action constituted an unfair labor practice under the Na- 
tional Labor Relations Act.7g In a similar case, a federal dis- 
trict court vacated an  arbitration award that allowed the em- 
ployer to compel its employees to operate vehicles that did not 
conform to certain provisions of the state vehicle code." 
C. Analysis 
The need for the illegality standard of review is obvious. As 
discussed earlier, federal courts are powerless to vacate arbi- 
tration awards under the manifest disregard of the law stan- 
dard. Were courts forced to rely on its strict application, none 
of the above awards would have been vacated because the arbi- 
trators often did not state their reasons for the award, and in 
cases where they did, they manifested no intention to disregard 
the law. Analysis of the three categories of illegality cases 
makes it even more apparent that the illegality standard of 
review is needed to check arbitration decisions. The first cate- 
gory of cases, where the arbitrator applies an  incorrect legal 
standard, seems most suspect. The Supreme Court has conclu- 
75. 646 F.2d at  267. 
76. Id. at 266. 
77. Id. at  268. 
78. 579 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 957 (1979). Another 
example is found in Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 520, Int'l Ladies' Garment 
Workers' Union, 283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961). 
79. 579 F.2d at  1286. 
80. Local Union 249, General Teamsters v. Consolidated Freightways, 464 F. 
Supp. 346, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1979). In another case, the Fourth Circuit held unen- 
forceable an arbitration award that required the employer to negotiate with a 
union that at the time of the enforcement adion no longer represented the employ- 
ees, having been decertified one week after the award was issued. Glendale Mfg. 
Co., 283 F.2d at 937-38. 
sively held that federal courts do not sit to reverse arbitrators' 
errors in legal interpretation?' Broadway Cab and Carte 
Blanche vacated arbitration awards where the arbitrator ap- 
plied incorrect legal standards because the legal error violated 
the law and public policy. This rationale seems inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court's present mandate. Either the courts 
simply erred or a real difference exists between mere legal 
error and legal error sufficiently egregious to actually violate 
law and public policy. But of course, any legal error, by defini- 
tion, violates the law. The obvious difficulties with this distinc- 
tion show that the cases may well have been incorrectly decid- 
ed. 
The second category of cases, where the underlying con- 
tract is illegal, more clearly demonstrates the need for judicial 
review. Regardless of how the arbitral process is characterized, 
one party ultimately presents a contract in a court of law for 
enforcement, I t  stands to reason, therefore, that the court 
should have the last say regarding the contract's validity. If the 
contract is illegal before arbitration, the arbitral process does 
not somehow legitimize the contract. Federal courts have the 
ultimate authority and responsibility to determine the legality 
of contracts presented for enforcement, whether directly in the 
context of a civil action, or indirectly, in the context of arbitra- 
tion awards. The arbitration process, even with its favorable 
underlying federal policy, does not diminish this responsibility. 
To give blind deference to arbitration awards in such cases is 
inappropriate because i t  may allow parties to avoid the law by 
resorting to a r b i t r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Cases in the last category, in which the award compels a 
violation of the law, offer the clearest rationale for the illegality 
standard of review. Because federal courts have the ultimate 
responsibility for enforcing the law, any arbitration award that 
on its face compels conduct in violation of the law deserves no 
deference and should be per se invalid. 
81. See cases cited supra note 58. 
82. Consider the following example. Suppose A and B enter into a contract, 
which contains an arbitration clause, to wager on the outcome of the World Series, 
an illegal agreement under state law. ARer the event, a dispute arises over the 
contracted point spread and the agreement is submitted to arbitration. The arbitra- 
tor rules in favor of B, who then presents the award in federal court for enforce- 
ment. Deference to this award would be inappropriate. 
7591 JUDICIAL REWIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS 775 
A. Historical Background 
The development of the public policy standard can be 
traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Hurd u. H ~ d g e . ~ ~  In 
Hurd, the Court held that federal courts' power to enforce pri- 
vate agreements was subject to the "limitations of the public 
policy of the United States as manifested in Constitutions, 
treaties, federal statutes and applicable legal  precedent^."^^ 
Although Hurd did not specifically deal with arbitration 
awards, its language appeared sufficiently broad to encompass 
such cases. 
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the public 
policy exception to arbitration awards in W.R. Grace & Co. u. 
Local Union 759, International Union of United Rubber Work- 
e r ~ . ~ ~  Grace had entered into a voluntary conciliation agree- 
ment with the Equal Opportunity Employment Board. The 
agreement, however, conflicted with seniority provisions of the 
employer's collective bargaining agreement with the union.g7 
Later, during a strike, the employer honored the conciliation 
agreement, thereby violating the collective bargaining agree- 
ment with the union? 
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the union 
filed a grievance with an arbitrator, who determined that, 
although Grace acted in good faith in honoring the conciliation 
agreement, it nevertheless violated the collective bargaining 
agreement?' Grace then filed suit to vacate the award on the 
ground that it  violated public policies encouraging both obe- 
83. For an excellent study of the public policy exception to judicial deference to  
arbitration awards, see Amanda J. Berlowe, Comment, Judicial Deference to Griev- 
ance Arbitration in the Private Sector: Saving Grace in the Search for a Well- 
Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 767 (1988). 
84. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). In Hurd, property owners sued to enforce property cov- 
enants barring the sale of real property in the neighborhood to blacks. Id. at 26- 
27. The court held that federal courts' power to enforce private agreements was re- 
stricted by public policy. Id. at  34-35. The Court refused to enforce the contract 
because it violated public policy. No statutory basis for 
the Fair Housing Act did not exist at  the time of this 
85. Id. at  35. 
86. 461 U.S. 757 (1983). 
87. Id. at  760. 
88. Id. at  760-61. 
89. Id. at  763-64. 
the decision existed because 
decision. 
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dience to court ordersg0 and voluntary compliance with Title 
VII.gl On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded: 
As with any contract, . . . a cou j may not enforce a 
collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public 
policy. . . . [Tlhe question of public policy is ultimately one for 
resolution by the courts. If the contract as interpreted [by the 
arbitrator3 violates some explicit public policy, we are obliged 
to refrain from enforcing it. Such a public policy, however, 
must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 
"by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from 
general considerations of supposed public interests."g2 
Application of this standard, however, proved to be difficult 
and the Supreme Court again addressed the issue four years 
later in United Paperworkers International Union u. Misco, 
I ~ C . ~ ~  There, an employee who operated dangerous machinery 
was fired after police arrested him for possession of illicit 
drugs.94 The union filed a grievance and the arbitrator rein- 
stated the employee, finding that the employer had no just 
cause for the di~charge.'~ The district court vacated the award 
and the court of appeals &rmed, ruling that reinstatement of 
the employee violated the public policy "against the operation 
of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol. y796 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of 
appeals based its judgment not on the existing Yaws and legal 
precedents," but rather on "general considerations of supposed 
public  interest^."^' The Court was careful to  note that al- 
though its W.R. Grace decision held that a court may refuse to 
enforce an arbitration award that violates public policy, it did 
not "sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration 
90. A federal district court had ordered Grace and the union to abide by the 
conciliation agreement. Id. at 761. Grace argued that the arbitration award was a 
disincentive to obey the court order. Id. at 767. 
91. Id. at 770-71. 
92. Id. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 US .  49, 66 (1945)) 
(citations omitted). 
93. 484 U.S. 29 (1987). 
94. Id. at 32-33. Police found the employee in the company parking lot "in the 
back seat of this car with marijuana smoke in the air and a lighted marijuana 
cigarette in the front seat ashtray." Id. at 33. 
95. Id. at 33-34. 
96. Id. at 35. 
97. Id. at 44. 
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awards as against public Thus, the exception is lim- 
ited to situations where "the contract as interpreted would vio- 
late some explicit public policy that is well defined and domi- 
nant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and 
legal  precedent^."^^ Moreover, "no violation of that policy was 
clearly shown in this case," for there was no showing that the 
employee was actually operating machinery while under the i d u -  
ence of drugs.'" "At the very least," the Court concluded, "an 
alleged public policy must be properly framed under the ap- 
proach set out in W.R. Gra~e."'~' 
Despite this attempt to clarify the public policy exception, 
the Court failed to address the issues "upon which the certiora- 
ri was granted," namely, "whether a court may refuse to en- 
force an  arbitration award only where the award itself violates 
positive law or requires unlawful conduct" and whether the 
public policy exception in the context of a collective bargaining 
agreement is the same as in the context of a contract.lo2 Jus- 
tice Blackmun noted that these "issues are left for another 
day."lo3 
B. Application 
Until Justice Blackmun's day comes, considerable uncer- 
tainty remains in the federal circuit courts regardbg the prop- 
er scope of the public policy exception.lo4 In light of the policy 
of judicial deference to arbitration awards, several federal cir- 
cuits hold that the award must actually compel a violation of 
positive law to meet the public policy exception. For example, 
in American Postal Workers Union v, United States Postal Ser- 
vice,'05 the D.C. Circuit refused to vacate an  arbitration 
award reinstating a discharged postal worker. The employee 
had admitted to converting government funds and was fired. 
After acquittal on criminal charges, an arbitrator reinstated 
98. Id. at 43. 
99. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 
Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983), and 
quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). 
100. Id. at 44. 
101. Id. at 43. 
102. Id. at 46 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
103. Id. 
104. Virtually all of the public policy exception cases involve labor arbitration 
awards where an employee has been reinstated. 
105. 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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the employee, finding that no just cause existed for his dismiss- 
a1.'06 The district court vacated the award, not because it 
violated law or public policy, but because the court substituted 
its interpretation of the contract for that of the arbitrator.''' 
Although the D.C. Circuit did not have to reach the issue, 
it reversed because the award itself compelled no violation of 
the law.'08 In short, the court stated that "an award will not 
be vacated even though the arbitrator may have made, in the 
eyes of judges, errors of fact and law unless it 'compels a viola- 
tion of law or conduct contrary to accepted public p~licy.'"''~ 
The court noted that there is "no legal proscription against the 
reinstatement of a person such as the grievant. And the award 
did not otherwise have the effect of mandating any illegal con- 
d~c t . " "~  The court implied, in effect, that the public policy 
exception refers only to the public policy against enforcing 
awards that by their terms compel a party to violate a positive 
law. 
The Ninth Circuit, en banc, has followed suit. In Stead 
Motors u. Automotive Machinists Lodge 1173,"' a mechanic 
was discharged after he failed to properly secure the front tire 
of a client's a~tornobile. '~~ The arbitrator ordered the employ- 
106. Id. a t  3. The arbitrator based his finding on an arguably erroneous inter- 
pretation of the Miranda warning requirements. Id. a t  3-4. The circuit court, 
however, noted that mere legal errors by arbitrators were not subject to judicial 
review. Id. a t  7. 
107. Id. at  4. 
108. From the facts of the case, it seems clear enough that the circuit court 
could have reversed because the district court reinterpreted the contract, an action 
clearly forbidden by the Supreme Court. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel 
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (holding that courts should refuse to "re- 
view the merits of an arbitration award"). 
109. American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at  7 (quoting Gulf States Tel. Co. v. 
Local 1692, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 416 F.2d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1969)). See 
also Washington-Hyphen Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 442 
F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
110. American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 8. The D.C. Circuit continues to 
follow this standard. See, e.g., United States Postal Sew. v. National Ass'n of 
Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refusing to vacate an 
arbitration award because it does not compel a violation of the law), cert. granted, 
484 US. 984 (1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1988); see also E.I. Dupont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 620 (7th Cir.) 
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("[tlhe question is whether the contract, as construed, 
violates positive law"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986). 
111. 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990). 
112. Id. a t  1202. The court noted that in 1984 the employee received a "warning 
notice for failing properly to tighten the lug bolts on the wheels of a car he had 
serviced." In 1985, after a dispute, the employee "was advised" that his foreman 
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ee to be reinstated after 120 days suspension.113 The plurality 
rejected the employer's public policy arguments, holding that 
"[ilf a court relies on public policy to vacate an arbitral award 
reinstating an employee, i t  must be a policy that bars reinstate- 
ment."l14 In other words, the award must compel a violation 
of law or conduct contrary to accepted public policy.l15 
Judge Trott's dissenting opinion fairly represents the con- 
trary views of other circuits. Judge Trott took issue with the 
fact that the employee was, reinstated "to the same position 
from which he was fired," and refused to accept the plurality's 
characterization of the case as a mere " 'reinstatement' of an  
errant empl~yee.""~ Rather, he noted that the job requires 
skill and care, as "unsafe cars injure and kill."l17 The concern 
was obviously for the welfare of the public, a group not repre- 
sented in this private transaction. 118 
Judge Trott agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's character- 
ization of the public policy exception in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Air Line Pilots Ass'n International.llg In Delta, a pilot was re- 
instated by an arbitration panel after being discharged for op- 
erating a passenger airliner while under the influence of alco- 
h01.l~~ The circuit court vacated the award because it violated 
public policy. The court stated: 
Misco requires the finding of a well defmed public policy and 
an award that conflicts with that  policy. The public policy of 
had " 'absolute authority' over matters such as proper lug bolt tightening proce- 
dures." The incident complained of occurred one month later. Id. 
113. Id. at 1203. 
114. Id. a t  1212. The employer argued that the reinstatement violated two pro- 
visions in the California Vehicle Code, which prohibited operation of unsafe vehi- 
cles, and he indicated that Stead Motors' certification may be revoked because of 
the incident. Id. at 1204. 
Judge Wallace, joined by three others, thought that the plurality should not 
have reached the issue. Id. a t  1224-25 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
115. Among others, the Sixth Circuit has also joined in this reasoning. See Inter- 
state Brands Corp. v. Chauffeurs Local Union No. 135, 909 F.2d 885, 893 (6th Cir. 
1990) ("The issue is not whether grievant's conduct for which he was disciplined 
violated some public policy or law, but rather whether the award requiring the 
reinstatement of a grievance . . . violated some explicit public policy."), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 1104 (1991). 
116. Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1218-19 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
117. Id. 
118. Judge Trott warned Stead Motors' customers, as well as county residents, 
to keep their seat belts fastened. Id. at  1218. 
119. 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989). 
120. Id. at  667-68. 
780 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
which the Supreme Court speaks in Misco seems to be a pub- 
lic policy not addressing the disfavored conduct, in the ab- 
stract, but disfavored conduct which is integral to the perfor- 
mance of employment duties. The question we are instructed, 
by Misco, to ask is not "Is there a public policy against the 
employee's conduct?", but, rather, "Does an established public 
policy condemn the performance of employment activities in 
the manner engaged in by the employee?"121 
After citing a myriad of statutes, rules, and regulations that 
clearly prohibited the operation of aircraft while under the 
influence of the circuit court explained that when 
an employee, in performing his duties, violates such clearly 
established laws and regulations, "a requirement that the em- 
ployer suffer that malperformance and not discharge the of- 
fender does itself violate the same well established public poli- 
cy ."123 
Judge Trott also agreed with the Eighth Circuit's decision 
in Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Interna- 
tional Brotherhood of Electrical workers .Iz4 In Iowa Electric, 
a nuclear power plant machinist, in a hurry to leave for lunch, 
breached the plant's security system, which was designed- t o  
protect the public from harmful radiation.125 He was dis- 
charged but later reinstated by an arbitrator. The circuit court 
affirmed the vacatur of the arbitration decision, concluding that 
it violated the well defined public policy requiring strict adher- 
ence to federal nuclear safety  regulation^.'^^ The court distin- 
guished Misco in part because the safety rules in that case 
were designed to protect other employees whereas the present 
safety regulations were fashioned to protect the public as 
127 
Judge Trott noted that under the standard adopted by the 
Ninth Circuit, limiting the public policy standard to situations 
where the award compels a violation of the law, neither Iowa 
Electric nor Delta would have qualified for judicial review. Such 
a restriction "chokes the 'public policy' exception . . . into obli~ion."'~~ 
Id. at 671. 
Id. at 672-73. 
Id. at 674. 
834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987). 
Id. at 1426. 
Id. at 1427. 
Id. at 1427 n.2. 
Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1221 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
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C. Analysis 
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The number of cases in which the award actually compels 
a violation of a positive law is extremely limited. Yet that is 
what is often required to qualify for the public policy exception. 
This requirement unnecessarily limits the otherwise viable 
exception and ignores its underlying policy. 
Misco expressly recognized that the underlying policy for 
the exception is that federal courts ultimately represent the 
interests of the public, who would otherwise be unrepresented 
in the private action before the court.12' With this in mind, 
Judge Trott's arguments make sense. Noting that the restric- 
tive standard requires a showing that the "award itself clearly 
violates a statutory prohibition," Judge Trott recognized that 
the "magic word 'reinstatement' " would preclude federal courts 
from vacating any arbitration award, no matter how egregious 
the "totality of facts and  circumstance^."^^^ Judge Trott pro- 
vided the following example. Suppose that a reckless or mali- 
cious lab technician were to introduce AIDS-contaminated 
blood into the nation's blood supply. This transaction would be 
"beyond the reach of the law in this circuit if a non-lawyer 
arbitrator, beholden to no one other than the parties to the 
contract in question, decided to" reinstate the employee.13' He 
continued: 
If an arbitrator uses the word "reinstatement," the federal 
courts in this circuit are now next to helpless to do anything 
The Second and Third Circuits have joined with the reasoning that supports a 
more broad application of the public policy exception. In Newsday, Inc. v. Long 
Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court's vacatur of an arbitration award reinstating an employ- 
ee after the arbitrator found that the employee had committed sexual harassment 
more than once. The arbitrator had decided that discharge was too severe a 
penalty for the present stage of the employee's disease. The circuit court agreed 
with the district judge's reasoning that the well-defined policy against sexual ha- 
rassment at  the workplace "is subverted when an employer is required to reinstate 
an employee who is a chronic sexual harasser." Id. 
In a similar case, Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Broth- 
erhood of Teamsters, No. 91-5261, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15559, at  *17-*18 (3d 
Cir. June 29, 1992), the Third Circuit upheld the district court's vacatur of an 
arbitration award "which fully reinstate[d] an employee accused of sexual harass- 
ment without a determination that the harassment did not occur" because the 
award violated public policy. 
129. Misco, 484 U.S. at  42. 
130. Stead Motors, 886 F.2d 1200, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1989) (Trott, J., dissenting). 
131. Id. at 1224 (emphasis added). 
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about it. A new form of kryptonite has been invented that 
renders us impotent to vindicate the public interest in health 
and safety. What amounts to a general policy favoring [arbi- 
tration] . . . now trumps the public policy exception . . . .IS2 
In short, the requirement that the award compel a viola- 
tion of a positive law robs the public policy exception of all its 
substance. As the Supreme Court noted in Misco and Grace, 
the asserted public policy must be "well defined and dominant" 
and determined by reference to the laws and legal precedents 
of the land.133 In the context of labor arbitration, there are 
simply no well defined and dominant laws against reinstate- 
ment when the employee's conduct is not considered. In the 
context of commercial arbitration, there is simply no well de- 
fined and dominant law against, for example, awarding a sum 
of money pursuant to a contract where the validity of the un- 
derlying contract is not considered. 
Furthermore, whether a public policy is well defined and 
dominant is determined by reference to the laws and legal 
precedents of the land. Therefore, if an award compels a viola- 
tion of a positive law, then undoubtedly the illegality standard 
would apply and the so-called public policy exception is left 
with no separate life of its own.134 But even if that were not 
enough, there can be little doubt that if an arbitrator were to 
order a party to violate a well defined and dominant law, the 
award could be vacated on one of the statutory g r 0 ~ n d s . l ~ ~  
Finally, a restrictive positive law test is wholly a t  odds 
with the underlying purpose of the public policy exception, 
especially in cases where the health and welfare of large num- 
bers of people are a t  risk. Thus, as Judge Trott noted, "[a] 
somewhat broader more rational approach grounded on analy- 
s i s  and  informed judgment-confined by 'law a n d  
precedent'-makes more sense in that it  gives life to the public 
132. Id. 
133. See Misco 484 U.S. at  44. 
134. See supra part IV. The illegality ground is supported by the policy that no 
court of law will lend its aid to any party in committing an illegal or immoral act 
and therefore should govern situations where an award compels a violation of the 
law. See Mkco, 484 U.S. at  42. 
135. See 9 U.S.C.A. 3 10(a)(l)-(5) (West Supp. 1992), which provides that an ar- 
bitration award may be vacated on the grounds of "corruption, fraud," "evident 
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators" or that the arbitrators "exceeded their 
powers." 
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rather than suffocating i t  beyond resusci- 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress has established four statutory grounds upon 
which an arbitration award may be vacated.13? The federal 
judiciary has created four additional standards of review for 
the vacatur of arbitration awards: (1) essence of the contract, 
( 2 )  manifest disregard of the law, (3) illegality, and (4) public 
policy. Most federal courts urge that these judicially created 
standards of review be applied narrowly in order to support the 
federal policy favoring arbitration, but many of the standards 
are currently interpreted so strictly that the judiciary actually 
undermines the validity of arbitration. 
Arbitration is no panacea. It cannot replace the courts, 
which are ultimately responsible for enforcing the laws of the 
land and safeguarding the unrepresented public. The arbitra- 
tor, often a non-lawyer, is merely a contract-reader. She is 
entirely beholden t o  the parties and their contract. While the 
judiciary should generally defer to the merits of an arbitration 
award, federal courts should not abdicate their essential role of 
enforcing the laws of the land and representing the public. 
Therefore, the federal judiciary should discard its present for- 
malistic approach and adopt "[a] somewhat broader more ratio- 
nal approach grounded on analysis and informed judg- 
ment."'" A more reasonable standard of review may empow- 
er  federal courts to vacate arbitration awards (1) when there is 
evidence that the arbitrator has disregarded the law, without 
requiring an express showing on the record of the arbitrator's 
intent to disregard the law; (2) when either the award itself or 
the underlying contract being interpreted is illegal; or (3) when 
the events underlying the arbitration award violate public 
policy, not only when the award itself strictly compels a viola- 
tion of the law. 
Bret F. Randall 
136. Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1222 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
137. See supra note 4. 
138. Stead Motors, 886 F.2d at 1222 (Trott, J., dissenting). 
